

[REDACTED]

Talking Points for the ADDI and ADDO

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Afghanistan: Implications of Regime Changes

Najibullah's assumption of power probably portends a more aggressive regime approach to the war and a heightened emphasis on subversion of Pakistan but is not likely to lead to any fundamental policy shifts.

- Najibullah is extremely close to Moscow and was probably installed because of Soviet unhappiness with Babrak's prosecution of the war and his inability to build an effective, durable regime.
- Najibullah's long background in intelligence -- where he earned a reputation as a ruthless and efficient manager -- coupled with his leading role in organizing tribal opposition in Pakistan suggest he will stress subversion and penetration of insurgent groups.

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Although the Soviets apparently hoped that Babrak's departure would dampen factional fighting in the ruling party, we believe Najibullah's ascension may well aggravate factional tensions in Afghanistan.

- He is a long time member of the dominant Parcham faction and is reported to have engaged in fierce struggles with rival Khalqi faction members in the past.
- Najibullah's relative youth -- at 39, he is at least a decade younger than most other Politburo members -- may also lead to some resentment against him in the party.
- For now, however, the regime is trying to present a facade of unity. Last week, Babrak, Najibullah and all leading members of the politburo were shown on TV greeting Soviet soldiers. Babrak will apparently retain his post as president of the Revolutionary Council and stay on the politburo.

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The timing of Babrak's ouster--on the eve of the resumption of peace talks in Geneva--suggests that Moscow intended the change to remove any symbolic grounds for Islamabad's continuing refusal to negotiate directly with the Babrak government because of its association with the Soviet invasion. We doubt it will encourage Islamabad to recognize Kabul before a comprehensive agreement is finalized, however.

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- Resistance leader Gailani told US officials that Zia had given the resistance an ultimatum: either agree on a resistance leader before a settlement is reached, or be prepared to fight with the Communists later.
- The Pakistanis, have since told US officials that they view Najibullah's ascension as a hardening of Soviet resolve and do not expect the move to have any effect on the Geneva process. Islamabad almost certainly finds Najibullah--the mastermind of Kabul's destabilization program in Pakistan's tribal areas--unacceptable. [REDACTED]

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UN-Sponsored Proximity Talks on Afghanistan

The current and seventh round of talks that began on 5 May, almost certainly will not result in resolution of the outstanding issues, and likely will be prolonged.

- The Pakistanis believe six months is an adequate timeframe for Soviet troop withdrawal [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Islamabad wants simultaneous implementation of all parts of the agreement--cessation of outside interference, international guarantees, the return of refugees, and troop withdrawal--while Kabul wants outside interference to stop before Soviet troops begin to withdraw.
- Islamabad rejects the concept of a joint Pakistani-Afghan commission to monitor implementation of the settlement and prefers that a UN or other neutral party assume responsibility for monitoring. The Soviets support UN negotiator Cordovez's proposal that a joint Pakistani-Afghan commission monitor implementation of the agreement, probably because they believe it would give at least the appearance of normalized relations. Islamabad rejects the idea and want a UN or other neutral party to monitor the agreement. [REDACTED]
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Despite their bouts of optimism, we believe the Pakistanis share our skepticism about Soviet intentions regarding the peace talks.

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The Pakistanis almost certainly would not cut back on existing [REDACTED] arms programs as a confidence-building measure to encourage Moscow to negotiate, but because of Prime Minister Junejo's political caution--endorsed, we believe, by Zia--Islamabad will continue to stonewall on new highly visible cross-border humanitarian aid programs.

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Pakistan: Internal Developments

Benazir Bhutto's nonviolent campaign to remove Zia as Army Chief and force new elections by this fall has been interrupted by Ramadan and the hot summer months. Neither Junejo nor Zia appears shaken by her rhetoric, and they have not restricted her activities.

- The two still believe that, given time, Bhutto and her People's Party will discredit themselves. Opinion polls suggest that 30-40 percent of Pakistanis are fence-sitters--indifferent to Zia and Junejo but suspicious of Bhutto.

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Although Zia recently hinted at new elections shortly before the current term ends in 1990, the government almost certainly will not meet Bhutto's Fall 1986 deadline.

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The PPP refuses on principle to open its books for inspection by the Election Commission in order to register.

- We believe radicals in the People's Party are likely to pressure Bhutto into a confrontational approach in the fall, but we doubt a call for civil disobedience would meet with widespread popular approval.

- If large-scale rioting were to develop, we believe the

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army would move forcefully, with Junejo's approval, to
put it down. [REDACTED]

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